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FIRST AMENDMENT-ELEMENTS OF
RETALIATION: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
RULES THAT INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS Do NOT NEED A PRE-
EXISTING COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP
WITH A GOVERNMENT ENTITY IN ORDER
TO BRING A CLAIM OF RETALIATION
Vincent P. Circelli*
N Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc. v. City of Lubbock,' a divided panel
of the Fifth Circuit ruled that private contractors do not need a "pre-
existing commercial relationship" with a government entity in order
to state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment. 2 The Fifth
Circuit took an ill-advised step in granting contractors the same rights to
bring retaliation claims as individual employees. In Board of County
Commissioners v. Umbehr, the Supreme Court specifically reserved the
question of whether First Amendment retaliation claims by independent
contractors require a pre-existing commercial relationship with a govern-
ment entity.3 While the Renda case may seem to be a harmless extension
of Umbehr, the decision actually unleashes a host of procedural and con-
stitutional problems. The Fifth Circuit's decision rests on an illogical
analogy between contracting corporations and individual employees, im-
poses federal oversight in an area traditionally and effectively controlled
by state law, and creates a needless circuit split by expanding rights
outside the text of the First Amendment. 4
The plaintiff in this case, Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc. ("Renda Con-
tracting"), is a Texas construction company that specializes in public
works projects.5 The defendant is the City of Lubbock, Texas ("the
City"). The City sought bids for a construction project on its city-wide
storm drainage system. 6 Renda Contracting submitted the lowest bid,
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. 463 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 386.
3. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 685 (1996).
4. Renda, 463 F.3d at 386-87 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 380.
6. Id. at 380-81.
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beating the second lowest bidder, Utility Contractors of America
("UCA"), by $2.2 million.7 Texas law requires that municipalities award
public works contracts to the "lowest responsible bidder."'8 Despite the
state law, Lubbock city officials recommended that the construction con-
tract go to UCA.9
Upon learning of the City's plans to award the contract to UCA, Oscar
Renda ("Mr. Renda"), the company's founder, requested a meeting with
City officials to discuss the award.10 At the meeting, City officials ex-
pressed their concern that Renda Contracting was "lawsuit happy" be-
cause of a previous suit by Renda Contracting against the El Paso Water
District ("the El Paso suit")." Mr. Renda explained the nature of the El
Paso suit, and left the meeting believing that he had assuaged the con-
cerns of the City officials. 12 The City officials relented and agreed to rec-
ommend Renda Contracting for the award, so long as Mr. Renda would
execute an affidavit affirming his knowledge of the contract specifica-
tions.13 Mr. Renda signed the affidavit the same day that the Lubbock
City Council awarded the contract. 14 The City Council, however, sur-
prised Mr. Renda by awarding the contract to UCA, citing its reserva-
tions about Renda Contracting's business practices.1 5 Mr. Renda,
however, claimed that the City's real motivation for rejecting his bid was
the earlier El Paso suit.1 6
Renda Contracting filed suit against the City in federal court, seeking
damages for its claim that the City retaliated against it for exercising its
First Amendment rights.' 7 The City moved to dismiss the case for failure
to state essential elements of retaliation, and the district court granted the
motion because "(1) Renda did not allege that the speech involved a mat-
ter of public concern to the relevant city ... and (2) Renda did not have a
pre-existing commercial relationship with the City.' 8
Renda Contracting appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed after re-
viewing the matter de novo.a9 Relying on analogies to the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Umbehr, the Fifth Circuit held that a pre-existing
relationship was not an essential element of the retaliation claim, and that
Renda Contracting adequately pled that its protected speech was a mat-
ter of public concern.20 The Fifth Circuit also relied on the dissent from
7. Id. at 381.
8. Tex. Loc. Gov't. Ann. § 252.043(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
9. Renda, 463 F.3d at 381.
10. Id.
11. See El Paso County Lower Valley Water Dist. v. Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc.,
No. 08-01-00473-CV, 2004 WL 1637990 (Tex. App.-El Paso, Jul 22, 2004, no pet.).






18. Id. (the City's motion to dismiss was made pursuant FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 383, 386.
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McClintock v. Eichelberger,21 a Third Circuit case in which the majority
refused to apply Umbehr to independent contractors with no pre-existing
commercial relationships.22 The Renda majority agreed with the McClin-
tock dissent that "all independent contractors fall within the standard set
forth in Umbehr.''2 3
The Renda court acknowledged that the "principal issue in this case is
whether the First Amendment protects a contractor whose bid has been
rejected by a city in retaliation for the contractor's exercise of freedom of
speech where the contractor had no pre-existing relationship with that
city."'24 The court answered this question in the affirmative, reasoning
that independent contractors and individual employees should have
nearly identical rights in bringing First Amendment retaliation claims.25
The court stated that refusing to accept the bid of an independent con-
tractor based on its previous exercise of free speech was tantamount to
not hiring a government employee for the same reason, which the Su-
preme Court deemed unconstitutional in Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois. 26
The holding in Renda originates from a string of highly contested Su-
preme Court decisions that greatly broadened the right to bring claims
for retaliation. The first case in the line was Elrod v. Burns, which held
that the firing of government employees based on their political affilia-
tion violated the employees' First Amendment rights.27 The next case,
Rutan, held that a government employer violated the First Amendment
when he based "promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions" of po-
tential employees on their political beliefs. 28 The Supreme Court first
extended certain First Amendment rights given to employees to indepen-
dent contractors in Umbehr and O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of
Northlake.29 Both Umbehr and O'Hare involved independent contrac-
tors that had pre-existing business relationships with a government entity.
In Umbehr, a trash hauler sued Wabaunsee County for terminating his
trash removal contract because of the hauler's criticism of the county
board of commissioners. 30 The Umbehr court found that the termination
of the contract violated the First Amendment. 31 In O'Hare, a tow-truck
company sued the City of Northlake for removing the tow-truck com-
pany's name from a rotation list of available towing services in retaliation
for the company's support of the mayor's rival. 32 The Court held that this
21. 169 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 1999).
22. See id. at 816-17.
23. Renda, 463 F.3d at 385.
24. Id. at 380.
25. See id. at 385.
26. Id. at 383, 385; see Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 72, 74, 110 (1990).
27. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
28. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 65.
29. 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
30. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 670-72 (1996).
31. Id. at 686.
32. See O'Hare, 518 U.S. at 715-16.
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
amounted to an unconstitutional denial of a contract. 33 While the Court
extended some First Amendment rights enjoyed by individual employees
to independent contractors, the Court was careful to limit its decisions
strictly to contractors with a "pre-existing commercial relationship with
the government. 34
The crux of the Renda majority's argument is that independent con-
tractors should be treated the same as individual government employees
in the context of retaliation claims. The Renda court claimed to draw this
inference from Umbehr, Rutan, and the dissent in McClintock. The court
began its analysis by asserting that "in a governmental employment con-
text ... no prior relationship is required before an employee is permitted
to assert a claim for First Amendment retaliation. '35 The court then
listed the essential elements for an employee's retaliation claim as the fol-
lowing: "(1) the employee must suffer an adverse employment decision;
(2) the employee's speech must involve a matter of public concern; (3) the
employee's interest in commenting on matters of public concern must
outweigh the defendant's interest in promoting efficiency; and (4) the em-
ployee's speech must have motivated the employer's adverse action. '36
The majority justified using the employee standard by claiming that the
Umbehr decision was an outright rejection of the notion that independent
contractors should be treated any differently than employees.37 The
Renda court acknowledged that the Supreme Court carefully limited its
holding in Umbehr to contractors with pre-existing commercial relation-
ships, but quipped that this issue was merely "reserved for another
day."'38 The Renda court then discussed the McClintock dissent, which
argued that there did not seem to be any indication in the Umbehr deci-
sion that the Court would not some day allow claims by contractors with
no pre-existing commercial relationship. 39 Finally, the Renda court ar-
gued that Justice Scalia's vehement dissent in Umbehr demonstrated
there was "no hope" that the Supreme Court would bar retaliation suits
by independent contractors with no pre-existing commercial relationship
"in the next case."140
Circuit Judge DeMoss dissented from the Renda majority on two
grounds: (1) the majority made a needless expansion into an area already
too far expanded upon; and (2) the majority's decision would lead to judi-
cial inefficiency.41 Judge DeMoss sided with Justice Scalia's dissents in
Umbehr and Rutan in questioning the logic of such broad rights to bring
33. Id. at 717.
34. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 685.
35. Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 463 F.3d 378, 383 (5th Cir.
2006).
36. Id. at 382 (citing Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 356 (5th Cir. 2004)).
37. See id. at 384.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 385 (relying on McClintock v. Eichelberger, 169 F.3d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 1999)
(Roth, J., dissenting)).
40. Id.; see Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. See Renda, 463 F.3d at 386 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
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retaliation claims. 42 The Renda dissent viewed the majority's interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment as an even greater expansion of an already
tenuous precedent, and did not want "to expand the free speech right of
corporations in this context where even the Supreme Court has yet to do
so.'"43 The dissent next argued that the panel should have upheld the
dismissal because doing so would have allowed the real controversy to be
resolved in state court, and thus, "would better serve the interest of fed-
eralism in providing the best forum for the resolution of the real
controversy. "44
The Renda majority took the final plunge down the slippery slope of
overly-broad claiming rights and impinged on federalism in the process.
As the Renda dissent argued, the majority should have been more reti-
cent to expand constitutional rights given the questionable precedent and
the viable state court alternatives to resolve the dispute. The Renda court
rushed to extend Umbehr without first considering the potential negative
consequences. The majority's decision creates a circuit split and muddies
the already complicated waters of government contracting. The Fifth Cir-
cuit should have followed the Third Circuit's lead in McClintock, where
that circuit dismissed a retaliation claim by a marketing firm without a
pre-existing relationship with the defendant. 45 The Third Circuit distin-
guished the McClintock facts from those of Umbehr and O'Hare, and
noted its hesitation to expand constitutional rights into an area that the
Supreme Court specifically refused to enter.46 The Renda court took the
opposite approach and strangely tried to use Umbehr's limitation to sup-
port its own decision. The majority cited the sardonic Umbehr dissent to
argue that the expansion of retaliation claims to contractors with no pre-
existing relationships was a forgone conclusion.47 In the cited dissent,
Justice Scalia predicted that the Umbehr majority's attempt to limit its
holding would not prevent the creation of a slippery slope, and that some
later court would ignore the express limitation and allow claims by con-
tractors with no pre-existing relationship.48 The Renda court indeed em-
braced this slippery slope and hurled itself down headlong with its
decision.
The heart of the Renda decision is based on the faulty premise that
there is no "legally relevant distinction" between independent contrac-
tors and individual employees. 49 This position is simply wrong. Corpora-
42. See id. at 386-87.
43. Id. at 387.
44. Id. Judge DeMoss states the real controversy is based on Tex. Loc. Gov't. Ann.
§ 252.043(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2005), which requires that municipalities award public
works contracts to the "lowest responsible bidder." Id.
45. McClintock v. Eichelberger, 169 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 1999).
46. Id. at 817.
47. See Renda, 463 F.3d at 385-86
48. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 709 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
49. See Renda, 463 F.3d at 384 (quoting Thomas Dagger, Political Patronage in Public
Contracting, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 518, 520 (1984)).
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tions like Renda Contracting have substantially different rights, interests,
and standing than individual employees. For instance,
Renda (i) is not eligible to vote ... (ii) is not eligible to ... hold any
public office; (iii) is not eligible to be a member of any political
party; (iv) is not eligible in Texas to make any contribution to any
political candidate ... (v) cannot be an employee of any governmen-
tal entity; and (vi) is not counted as a "person" in any census. 50
Additionally, government employees are always individuals, to whom the
"termination or denial of a public job is the termination or denial of a
livelihood. '51 A public contractor, however, is usually a corporation that
is not dependant on any single potential government contract, which it
has no guarantee of attaining.5 2 As the Renda dissent pointed out, the
decision transforms the First Amendment's text from the words, "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech" into the
unrecognizable command that "[a] city council . . . shall not deny the
award of any contract [to a corporation]. . . on the grounds that such
corporation has previously filed suit against another government en-
tity."' 53 Because the Renda decision relies on an illogical comparison be-
tween an individual employee and a corporation, the panel should have
decided to "dig in [its] cleats" and stop the descent down the slippery
slope rather than read into the text of the First Amendment what it
clearly does not say. 54
The Renda decision also impinges on federalism by creating needless
federal oversight in an area already effectively controlled by Texas law.
The Fifth Circuit should have followed the Third Circuit's reluctance to
create new constitutional rights when doing so causes the judiciary to "in-
trude itself into such traditional practices as contract awards.155 The
Third Circuit also pointed out that if expansion had to be made, it should
only be done by the Supreme Court.56 There is no need to extend such a
claiming right, as "all [fifty] states have enacted legislation imposing com-
petitive bidding requirements on ... contracts with the government. '57
The breadth of state law in the area assures more predictable protection
of contractor rights than the "blunt instrument" of constitutional over-
sight.5s The situation in Renda, in particular, is not one that the Fifth
Circuit should have felt compelled to impose federal oversight upon, as
Texas has a statute that would have resolved the "real controversy" of the
50. Id. at 387.
51. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 696 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Renda, 463 F.3d at 386.
54. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 696 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. McClintock v. Eichelberger, 169 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Horn v.
Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 678 (3d Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Umbehr, 518 U.S.
668).
56. Id.
57. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 694.
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case.59 By eliminating state sovereignty over this issue, Renda has dam-
aged the already weakened bedrock of federalism.
60
Finally, the Renda majority's holding will unleash a flood of new litiga-
tion by disappointed contractors against local government entities, which
in turn will lead to economic waste both for governmental entities forced
to defend lawsuits, and for federal courts forced to wade through the
merits of each well-pled retaliation claim. The Umbehr dissent pointed
out that the amount of government contracts worth litigating far outnum-
bers the amount of similar employee cases.61 That dissent, however, was
speaking only of suits initiated by contractors with pre-existing business
relationships, while the Renda court opens the gates to a vastly greater
number of potential litigants. Courts will be forced to assume every dis-
gruntled contractor's pleading is true, despite having no pre-existing rela-
tionship to a government entity, and grant it a free pass through the
dismissal stage. This decision puts an unnecessary encumbrance on the
already complicated area of government contracting, not to mention the
added caseload it will thrust upon the overburdened federal courts.
In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit erred in its decision not to require a
pre-existing commercial relationship as an essential element for retalia-
tion claims by independent contractors. The Renda decision relied on an
illogical analogy between independent contractors and individual em-
ployees. The Renda court's reliance on Umbehr is also misplaced, as the
Supreme Court specifically asserted that its decision did not apply to in-
dependent contractors with no pre-existing commercial relationships.
Rather than being a simple extension of First Amendment protection, the
panel's decision invites judicial uncertainty by creating a federal circuit
split. The decision also impinges on federalism, and will lead to a flood of
lawsuits. The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc should overturn this panel deci-
sion in the name of common sense and judicial efficiency. The circuit
split created by the case may well lead the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari to Renda or a like case. If such a case does reach the Court, it should
seize the opportunity to halt the excessive expansion of retaliation claims,
and perhaps overturn the questionable ruling in Umbehr.
59. Renda, 463 F.3d at 387 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
60. See id.
61. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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